A spinning top model of formal structure and informal behaviour: dynamics of advice networks in a commercial court by Lazega, Emmanuel et al.
European Management Review (ZOOS) 3, I I3- I22 
0 2006 EURAM Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. All rights resewed 1740-4754/06 $30.00 
palgrave-journals.com/em r 
A Spinning top model of formal 
organization and informal behavior: 
dynamics of advice networks among 
judges in a commercial court 
Emmanuel Lazega', Claire Lemercier2, Lise Mouniea 
'C.E.R.S.O., Universite de Paris IX - Dauphine, Place du Marechal de Lattre de Tassigny, Paris, France; 
21.H.M.C.-C.N.R.S., 45 rue d'Ulrn, Paris, France; 
3Centre Maurice Halbwachs-C.N.R.S., 48 boulevard Jourdan, Paris, France 
Correspondence: 
E Lazega, C.E.R.S.O., UniversiU de Paris IX - Dauphine, Place du Marechal de Lattre de Tassigny, 75775 Paris Cedex 16, 
France. 
Tel: 01 44 05 42 03 
E-mail: emmanuel.la2egaedauphine.+ 
Abstract 
The longitudinal study of advice networks among 240 judges at the Commercial Court of 
Paris permits the examination of learning as an interactive process. We argue that a 
spinning top model is a useful heuristic for intra-organizational learning in dynamic advice 
networks. This model proposes that a stabilized elite preserves accumulated knowledge in 
a community that overall experiences high turnover and systematic job rotation, and hence 
runs the danger of inadequately sharing knowledge among its members. We test the 
model by analyzing the structure and dynamics of advice networks among judges at the 
Commercial Court of Paris. This dynamic structure reflects the informal homophilous 
preferences among judges organized in a strong formal system, a high relational turnover 
in the selection of advisors, and the emergence of an elite of senior advisors that stabilizes 
the learning process - much like the behavior of a spinning top. This case study also 
identifies an endogenous process of increasing and then decreasing centralization of this 
network over time, raising questions about the maintenance of the stability of the pecking 
order and about the relationship between learning and seniority. Results illustrate the 
importance of dynamic over static network analysis and call for a renewed attention to 
formal structure in organizations. 
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Introduction 
ntra-organizational learning has long been considered 
a central process in organizations.' The study of I this process is becoming increasingly important as the 
number of knowledge-intensive organizations - which 
thrive on innovation - increases, and with it the search 
for new competitive advantages. Learning as a relational 
and interactive process can be captured through the study 
of advice networks. In organized contexts, consulting with 
someone is usually possible through social exchange in 
which members obtain advice in exchange for recognition 
of status and authority of the advisor (Blau, 1955, 1964), 
which we call 'cognitive status'. Members with cognitive 
status usually have hierarchical andlor expert authority 
(Lazega, 1992). 
Intra-organizational learning thus depends on the 
capacity of the formal organization to channel informal 
advice seeking. This channelling maintains a good propor- 
tion of advice seeking within the boundaries of the 
organization. It can create a fragile equilibrium between, 
on the one hand, rapid overall relational turnover in the 
selection of advisors and, on the other hand, the existence 
of a stabilized but adaptable elite of advisors with cognitive 
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status. The formal organization drives the evolution of the 
advice network itself. 
We argue that the image of a spinning top represents this 
process heuristically. Members of organizations rely on 
homophilous choices to find advisors. High turnover and 
systematic job rotation, however, weaken such homophi- 
lous ties. We compare the formal organization and the 
rotation movement that it creates among its members to the 
body of the spinning top. When this movement destroys 
homophilous advice ties, members turn to a small and 
stable elite of authoritative advisors who can thus be 
compared to the stationary spin axis of the top. The 
equilibrium reached by the top represents the structural 
condition for intra-organizational learning. When formality 
works (Stinchcombe, 2001), knowledge accumulated in the 
organization is preserved in spite of high turnover and 
systematic job rotation. 
However, this equilibrium is fragile. In effect, when 
advice networks become too centralized, there is overload 
for members with cognitive status. Actors at the top of the 
pecking order of the advice network have to choose 
between overload of advice seekers and delegation of some 
of their status - with conflicts of interpretation (with other 
elite advisors) that come attached to delegation. The 
mechanism is thus based on the social production of 
cognitive authorities and the fragile equilibrium that the 
formal organization must reach in order to keep them 
useful and productive. 
In sum, the dynamics of intra-organizational learning 
depend on formal organization in three distinct ways. First, 
the rotation movement created by the formal organization 
destroys ties based on homophilous choices. Second, this 
movement also creates an elite of advisors with cognitive 
authority. Third, turnover and/or conflicts among members 
of the elite itself requirehequires a dynamic process of 
stabilization of this pecking order over time. 
The empirical data on which the study of these processes 
is based is an organizational and longitudinal network 
study of advice seeking among judges at the Commercial 
Court of Paris. In this study, 240 judges (all lay, voluntary, 
and elected judges coming from the local business 
community) were interviewed altogether about their 
advice-seeking relationships within the court. We obtained 
three measurements of this complete network in 2000,2002, 
and 2005. We test parts of our model of the dynamics of 
intra-organizational learning statistically, using the so- 
called p2  (Van Duijn, 1995; Van Duijn et d., 2004) and 
Siena (Snijders, 2001, 2005) models. The models are 
applied, respectively, to examine the influence of formal 
structure of the organization on the selection of advisors, 
and on the characteristics of the relational turnover in 
the advice networks among the judges. They confirm the 
heuristic value of the spinning top model. Finally, we 
speculate about the implication of this heuristic model for 
future research on the topic and for the evaluation of the 
capacity of modern organizations to be learning-friendly 
environments accommodating complex learning dynamics. 
Advice networks and intra-organizational learning 
Knowledge about how advice networks contribute to intra- 
organizational learning can be useful to the study of the 
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relationship between formal organization and informal 
behavior. An advice network represents a set of paths 
through which appropriate information circulates among 
members of an organized setting. The allocation of this 
resource through informal ties and interactions reduces the 
costs of its acquisition during the process of making 
decisions to solve problems. Members of organizations see 
expertise and experience as accumulated by the organiza- 
tion, and they rely constantly on advice from others. 
However, intra-organizational learning through advice 
seeking does not simply result from the accumulation of 
individually and informally acquired information. The 
process is socially organized in a sophisticated way. 
The association of the social organization of learning, 
one the one hand, and social networks, on the other hand, 
is not in itself a new insight. Different approaches have 
dominated the recent literature on these topics. One 
example is the theory of communities of practice (Brown 
and Duguid, 1991; Lave and Wenger, 1991; Raelin, 1997). 
This theory assumes that ‘collaborative networks’, in and 
across companies, can be managed to generate such 
communities of practice. These communities should have 
effects on performance through facilitating learning, 
mastering a domain of expertise, accelerating innovation. 
For Wenger et aZ. (2002), learning in such communities 
includes at the very least mutual commitment in relation- 
ships developed over time and identification of who knows 
what. 
Another example is provided by ‘learning network 
theory’ (Van der Krqgt, 1998; Poell and Van der Krogt, 
1998; Dimovski and Skerlavaj, 2004), which assumes that 
members learn in every organization and that the learning 
network merely represents how learning is organized. This 
leads these authors to identify four kinds of learning 
networks. A ‘liberal’ learning network emerges in unstruc- 
tured, chaotic organizations; a ‘vertical’ learning network in 
formalized Tayloristic bureaucracies; a ‘horizontal’ network 
of peers in egalitarian organizations (Senge, 1990); and an 
‘external’ learning network in organizations where employ- 
ees have a strong o;ientation towards their professional 
field (Dimovski and Skerlavaj, 2004). 
Neither the communities of practice, nor the learning 
network literatures examine the structure and dynamics of 
the networks that they assume to be critical to learning. 
Without systematic and empirical tests, they rely heavily on 
ideal-types that ignore the complexity of collective learning 
as a social process. They are also limited in their 
contribution to our understanding of intra-organizational 
learning because they do not associate this process with 
formal structure, authority relationships, social exchange, 
and specific relational structures. 
This paper offers insights about intra-organizational 
learning based on a micro-sociology of knowledge (Lazega, 
1992) and on network analysis. This micro-sociology has 
also long recognized that learning and knowledge are not 
purely individual. Learning consists in acquisition and 
evaluation, by the members of the organization, of 
appropriate information and knowledge. In our view, 
learning as a relational and interactive process can be 
captured through the study of advice networks and social 
exchange of advice for recognition of cognitive status and 
authority. 
Dynamics of advice networks 
In organizations examined by researchers, advice seeking 
converges towards senior and recognized members and 
reflects a process of cognitive alignment on such members 
who gained the ‘authority to know’, who provide social 
approval for specific decisions, and who contribute to the 
integration of the organization because they link the 
individual, group, and organizational levels. We think of 
this alignment as a key ingredient of intra-organizational 
learning. A status hierarchy provides a social incentive for 
actors to share their knowledge and experience with others, 
thus helping in explaining the social organization of the 
learning process.* 
Because advice networks are usually shaped by such 
status games, they are usually highly centralized. They 
exhibit a pecking order that often closely follows the 
hierarchical structure of the ~rganization.~ Members of 
formal organizations rarely declare that they seek advice 
from ‘people below’ in this pecking order. In addition to the 
existence of a core set of central advisors, the periphery of 
the network can be complex and characterized by homo- 
philous (Lazega and Van Duijn, 1997; McPherson et al., 
2001) horizontal ties (i.e. ties among peers). Members use 
such ties to mitigate the potentially negative effects of this 
strong rule for intra-organizational action and learning 
(negative effects resulting, for example, from not being 
willing to show that one does not know). Thus, advice 
networks tend to be both hierarchical and cohesive (at least 
within subsets of peers), with the hierarchical dimension 
usually stronger than the cohesive one. In some firms, 
advice ties are so important that they also play an 
important role in facilitating the flows of other kinds of 
resources in co-work and friendship ties (Lazega and 
Pattison, 1999). 
Members with cognitive status usually have hierarchical 
and/or expert authority. Nevertheless, formal structure 
is often neglected in recent work on learning. The formal 
organization drives the evolution of the advice net- 
work itself for at least two reasons: firstly because 
it is the formal organization that allocates different forms 
of status (hierarchical, expert) to its members and secondly 
because it has rules for turnover and job rotation that 
have an effect on selection of advisors. Organizations 
willing to improve retrieval and protection of their tacit 
and codified knowledge must be aware of social processes 
that shape the evolution of such networks. However, 
the evolution of advice seeking and giving in a complete 
network has not been studied very closely before. Modeling 
these dynamics is thus both important substantively 
and new methodologically. We propose a heuristic model 
that accounts for the dynamics of advice networks in 
organizations. 
This model, called ‘spinning top model’, brings together 
previous knowledge on advice networks and sheds some 
new light on intra-organizational learning. In particular, 
we assume that such a process depends on the capacity of the 
organization to generate an elite of authoritative advisors 
that manages to remain stable while advice ties among 
other members of the organization are subjected to rapid 
turnover (e.g., by a rotation policy, by career movement, by 
the need to find new knowledge that old advisors cannot 
provide (Ortega, 2001; Argote et al., 2005)). More generally, 
the spinning top model illustrates a new approach to the 
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relationship between formal organization and informal 
social behavior and processes. 
A spinning top model for a dynamic process 
To further explore the link between advice networks and 
intra-organizational learning, it is important to focus on the 
temporal and dynamic dimension of this process (Crossan 
et al., 1999; Easterby-Smith et al., 2000; Bapuji and Crossan, 
2004). Learning occurs over time and across levels, if only 
because members can ‘unlearn’ and because they must 
combine what they already know to new knowledge that 
they build in order to make new decisions. Stable, 
unchanging advice networks reduce the cost of acquiring 
timely information, but also increase the risk of acquiring 
obsolete and inappropriate information. The quality of 
intra-organizational learning thus depends on changes in 
these networks. There is a need for a theory of their 
evolution. It is our intention in this paper to contribute to 
the description of these dynamics. We use our spinning top 
model as a guiding metaphor for research on the relation- 
ship between formal organization and intra-organizational 
process in general, and here on intra-organizational 
learning in particular. 
The spinning top heuristic brings together at least three 
components: a rotating body, a rotation axis, and a fragile 
equilibrium that depends, in parts, on characteristics of the 
previous components. Time is taken into account through 
rotation movement and speed. We think of the rotating 
block as the learning organization. The rotation axis can 
represent the pecking order, that is, the emergent hierarchy 
of members with cognitive status. These members have the 
‘authority to know’ in the organization. Rotation rules 
across intra-organizational boundaries and through status 
differences summarize formal structure. The fragile equili- 
brium created by the rotation movement represents the 
structural condition for learning collectively in the organi- 
zation. This equilibrium itself depends on the stability of 
the rotation axis and the shape of the organization. 
This picture is heuristic for several reasons. First, it 
suggests that time is important in allowing organizations to 
select members with cognitive status. Cognitive status 
builds up by reputation for expertise, by the capacity to 
provide quality control without raising too many con- 
troversies or conflicts of definition of the situation, by 
the trained capacity to speak legitimately on behalf of the 
collective. Acquiring this status takes efforts and time. The 
‘authority to know’ is produced by long-term individual 
and collective investments that can be ruined if members 
with cognitive status leave and behave too opportunisti- 
cally. The equilibrium reached by the spinning top thus 
suggests that members with status and cognitive authority 
in the organization have a strong incentive to keep their 
status and authority over time, even at some extra expense, 
to avoid the loss of advantages that come attached to their 
relative standing: 
Second, this heuristic also suggests that the equilibrium 
reached by the spinning top is fragile. The number of 
members with cognitive status varies over time. We can 
think of several reasons for which this number oscillates, 
that is, increases and decreases over time. One reason is 
that members tend to choose advisors that they perceive to 
* 
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be the most popular (i.e. already chosen by a large number 
of colleagues). Members sought out by many other 
members tend to build a reputation; selecting them is 
perceived to be safe and legitimate. As stressed by a 
micropolitical perspective, everyone seeks status and 
believes that they will reach a higher status; access to 
advisors higher up in the ladder becomes in itself a sign of 
relative status. This implies that a member highly sought 
out in time t l  becomes even more intensively sought out in 
time t2. 
Another reason is that this behavior creates an overload 
of requests for advice from a small number of highly central 
advisors with high cognitive status. Highly sought out 
advisors often manage this overload by delegating, that is, 
referring the advice seeker to other advisors.’ This 
management of overload threatens the stability of the 
pecking order in the sense that it brings in new central 
advisors and requires coordination among the elites in 
order to avoid destructive status competition and conflicts 
of definition of the situation between too many chefs. In 
turn, this strategy triggers either formal efforts of 
coordination among the elites or a new reduction in the 
number of advisors with high cognitive status through 
withdrawal of central advisors who become unavailable 
(due to retirement or delegitimation). This oscillation 
threatens the stability of the pecking order, with both 
positive or negative effects on intra-organizational learning. 
These are not simple processes. The spinning top 
heuristic thus suggests that centralization of advice net- 
works can either remain stable, or increase over time, or 
decrease over time to reach a balance between elite 
overload and conflicts of interpretation among them. This 
metaphor thus leads to the following claims describing 
the structure and dynamics of advice networks and intra- 
organizational learning. 
Descriptive claims 
Based on the literature mentioned above, we can expect to 
observe two basic characteristics of advice networks as 
driven by formal structure. First, advice networks should be 
characterized by a pecking order reflecting status differ- 
ences. Second, they should also be characterized by 
homophilous, horizontal ties. Such characteristics are time 
invariant. 
Based on our spinning top heuristic, we can expect two 
additional characteristics of advice networks when exam- 
ined longitudinally. Third, to some extent, the pecking 
order in advice networks should be stable over time. In 
effect, the spinning top model suggests that this pecking 
order exists because it helps members deal with the 
relational turnover created by rotation movements. Fourth, 
stability of the pecking order is not automatic; it is fragile 
and threatened, over time, by expansion, turnover, or 
conflicts among the elite themselves. Centralization of 
advice networks should oscillate, that is, increase and 
decrease over time as members of the elite of advisors 
either leave (and are ‘replaced’ by new members) or try to 
reach a balance between high individual status and 
overload on the one hand, and consensus on the definition 
of the situation on the other hand. Periods of centralization 
of advice networks should be followed by periods of decline 
in this centralization, then by periods of recentralization. 
One of the true challenges facing formal organizations with 
respect to collective learning is then to maintain the 
stability of the pecking order. 
Methods 
Although these claims are descriptive, they introduce a 
temporal dimension providing new insights in an explora- 
tory field of research. In particular, we establish these 
descriptive claims in one specific organization with 
statistical models called p2  and Siena. They are applied to 
examine the influence of structural variables on relational 
turnover in these networks (Doreian and Stokman, 1997). 
They can thus confirm the heuristic value of the spinning 
top model for intra-organizational learning through advice 
networks. 
The p2 model (Van Duijn, 1995; Lazega and Van Duijn, 
1997; Van Duijn et al., 2004) provides a flexible way for 
using explanatory variables to model network structure. We 
apply it to examine the influence of formal structure of 
the organization on interactions among its members. The 
explanatory (independent) variables are actor and dyad 
characteristics, related to or derived from actors’ formal 
positions in the organization and other relative character- 
istics. Standard statistical methods, based on loglinear 
analysis or logistic regression, assume each actor’s choices 
to be independent; such methods do not take into account 
the fact that the informal interactions between actors are 
mutually related (Krackhardt, 1988). In p2 models, the unit 
of analysis, or dependent variable, is the binary relationship 
from one actor to the other; but it takes into consideration 
the dependency between the two relationships constituting 
a dyad as well as the interdependence between relationships 
from and to one actor. 
The assumption of dyad independence is relaxed in the 
p2 model by incorporating random parameters for each 
actor with an appropriate covariance structure, represent- 
ing the interdependence between relationships from and to 
the same actor. The random actor parameters are viewed as 
error terms in the regression equation or, equivalently, as 
unexplained parts of the sender and receiver parameters? 
The models allows researchers to estimate parameters for 
the propensity of actors to send choices, for the propensity 
of actors to receive choices, for the propensity of actors 
reciprocate choices, and for a more general mean tendency 
(density) to interact with each other. When the density 
parameter is modeled, as below, a linear relationship 
between this parameter and dyadic attributes is assumed. 
Studying the dynamics of networks raises difficult 
methodological issues that are addressed by recently 
developed methods presented in Snijders (2001, 2004, 
ZOOS), Snijders and Huisman (2002), Huisman and Snijders 
(2003) under the name of Siena (for SimuIation Investiga- 
tion for Empirical Network AnaZysis). It is a program for the 
analysis of repeated (longitudinal) data on social networks. 
The statistical analysis is carried out on the basis of 
computer simulation of a probabilistic model for the 
evolution of the social network. Siena focuses on differ- 
ences between two (or more) observations of the same 
network, that is, on relational changes made over time by 
members of the network. Dynamics of social networks are 
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complex due to endogenous feedback effects (e.g., in 
reciprocity, transitivity, popularity, subgroup formation, 
in which the existence of ties is highly dependent on the 
existence of other ties). Siena also comprises a random 
influence in the simulation model to account for ‘un- 
explained variability‘ associated with endogenous effects. 
Structural endogenous effects are measured in Siena in 
standard ways. Reciprocity is defined by the number of 
reciprocated ties. Transitivity is defined by the number of 
transitive patterns in i’s relations (ordered pairs of actors 0, 
h) to both of whom i is tied, while j is also tied to h).  
Generalized exchange is measured by the number of three 
cycles in i’s network, that is, cycles in which i seeks advice 
from j ,  j from k and k from i .  Structural effects can also be 
presented as attributes, as will be the case here. In Siena, 
the ‘Popularity alter effect’ is defined by l / n  times the sum 
of the indegrees of the others to whom i is tied. It measures 
the extent to which members tend to select as advisors 
members who are already sought out for advice by others. 
The ‘Activity of alter’ effect is defined by l /n  times the sum 
of the outdegrees of the others to whom i is tied. It 
measures the extent to which members who seek out many 
advisors tend to be sought out themselves as advisors. We 
introduce these effects in the analyses presented below. 
Data 
Our site is a first-level judicial organization, the Commer- 
cial Court of Paris, in which members - who are lay judges 
- share expertise and consider intra-organizational learning 
to be efficient. We establish our descriptive claims using 
observations of advice seeking among the judges in this 
court. The Commercial Court of Paris is an interesting 
organization for our purpose because it has a visible and 
formal rotation rule that reallocates the judges to different 
Chambers each year. Thus, this organization is particularly 
useful to explore the spinning top model of formal 
organization, informal advice seeking, and the dynamics 
of organizational learning. 
The court is composed of twenty specialized and 
generalist Chambers dealing with very heterogeneous forms 
of commercial litigation (company law, European commu- 
nity law, international law, unfair competition, multimedia 
and new technologies, etc.) and bankruptcies. It handles 
around 12% of all the commercial litigation in France, 
including large and complex cases (that do not go to 
arbitration courts). Judges are business people who work as 
unpaid judges, elected for 2 or 4 years (for a maximum total 
of 14 years) by the members of the Chamber of Commerce 
of their local jurisdiction and by sitting  judge^.^ They follow 
a work schedule that rotates them, on a yearly basis, from 
one Chamber to another. The rotation policy of judges 
across Chambers is meant to prevent corruption or 
conflicts of interests (e.g., the occurrence of certain 
obvious, visible, and damaging homophily effects, such as 
judges coming from the banking industry concentrating in 
bankruptcy Chambers). 
Tasks are complex and judges have discretion in many 
areas of business law. Disagreements abound about 
solutions to provide for many legal problems. Commercial 
litigation is very heterogeneous and conflict resolution 
often depends on knowledge of the business and specific 
industry in which the conflict takes place. These judges thus 
seek each other for advice intensively in order to manage 
these uncertainties intra-organizationally, by tapping into 
the expertise and experience of their heterogeneous set of 
colleagues. 
We collected data of interest to the argument of this 
paper at three points in time (fall 2000, fall 2002, and fall 
2005). We included the following name generator in the 
interviews with all the judges about their advice seeking 
among each other: ‘Here is the list of all your colleagues at 
this Tribunal, including the President and Vice-presidents of 
the Tribunal, the Presidents of the Chambers, the judges, 
and ‘wise-men’. Using this list, could you check the names of 
colleagues from whom you have asked advice during the last 
two years concerning a complex case, or with whom you 
have had basic discussions, outside formal deliberations, in 
order to get a different point of view on this case.’ A high 
response rate allowed us to reconstitute, at each point in 
time, the complete advice network (outside formal delib- 
erations) among judges at this courthouse. The number of 
judges at the court varied between 151 and 156 between 
2000 and 2005 (with an 87.1% average response rate over 
the three measurements). 
Results 
Using this data set, we tested the four descriptive claims 
formulated above. 
The pecking order among judges 
Our first descriptive claim predicted that we should observe 
a pecking order in these networks. Consistent with Blau 
(1955) and subsequent studies of advice networks, we did 
find the familiar pecking order in this data, as confirmed 
by visual inspection in Figure 1. There is a small ‘elite’ of 
advisors, a small fraction of judges who are consulted much 
more often than others. They are not formally assigned to 
7” 
35 
0 10 20 30 40 
lndegree Centrality Wave 1 
Figure 1 A stable pecking order in the advice network among the judges of 
the Commercial Court of Paris. This table plots indegree centrality scores of 
the 91 judges who responded to the name generator in both wave 1 and 
wave 2. Correlation between scores in the two waves is 0.9. 
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such a job, but they are often senior judges and presidents 
of Chamber (Lazega and Mounier, 2003). 
A few central members achieve extremely high scores. 
These highly central judges are among the most senior. 
Recall that individuals can be judges for a maximum of 
fourteen years. Within a couple of years, these ‘outliers’ exit 
the system and are replaced by upcoming successors. 
Chamber homophily among judges 
Our second descriptive claim predicted the existence of 
homophilous horizontal ties that mitigate the potentially 
negative effects of status games related to the pecking order 
and the tendency not to seek advice from colleagues ‘below’ 
in terms of status. To establish this claim, we used a specific 
dimension of the formal structure of this organization 
which can be expected to be the most important because it 
is consistently present in the judges’ mind Chamber 
membership. Using a p2 model, we test for a Chamber 
homophily effect because it can matter heavily in the flows 
of advice. Exchanges are easier with members of one’s own 
Chamber. Table 1 tests for the existence of this homophily 
effect in the advice network in this organization for the 
second observation of the network. 
The first part of the table (Random effects) displays the 
variances of the random effects that characterize, as 
Table 1 Chamber homophily in judges’ choices of advisors 
mentioned above, the p2  model. Here the amount of 
variation in sender and receiver activity is presented. These 
effects covary negatively; the more judges tend to seek 
advice, the less likely it is that advice is sought from them. 
The second part of the table (Fixed effects) displays overall 
fxed effects and specific fued effects. First, under overall 
fixed effects, overall density and reciprocity effects are 
displayed. The negative value of the density parameter 
indicates that the probability of a relation is smaller than 
0.5 when all other parameters and the random effects are 
equal to zero. The reciprocity parameter is positive, 
indicating that advice relations have a tendency to be 
symmetrical (but not an extremely strong tendency 
compared to the size of the density effect). Below, under 
‘Specific density similarity effect’, the table displays the 
specific effect in which we are particularly interested (in 
bold): Chamber similarity. We find a strong, positive, and 
significant value for this parameter, indicating that the 
probability of an advice tie increases when judges are 
members of the same Chamber. Belonging to the same 
Chamber, that is, working together often, has a positive 
effect on establishing an advice relationship. Finally, model 
fit measures (Deviances) show the difference between the 
full and empty models. They are 3266.34 for the empty 
model (i.e. the model without the Chamber similarity 
effect) and 3121.14 for the full model (i.e. the model with 
Independent variable Parameter estimates 
Full model Empty model 
Sender variance 
Receiver variance 
Sender receiver covariance 
Overall effects 
Density 
Reciprocity 
Specific density similarity effect 
Chamber similarity 
Random effects 
3.08 (0.48) 2.63 (0.39) 
2.70 (0.66) 2.22 (0.35) 
-0.47 (0.35) -0.10 (0.24) 
Fixed effects 
-5.98 (0.20) -5.55 (0.15) 
1.64 (0.29) 1.73 (0.28) 
1.79 (0.15) 
Deviances 
3121.14 3266.34 
This table presents a p2 model of advice seeking among judges in Wave 2. The first part of the table (Random effects) displays the 
variances of the random effects. Here the amount of variation in sender and receiver activity is presented. These effects covary 
negatively; the more judges tend to seek advice, the less likely it is that advice is sought from them. The second part of the table (Fixed 
effects) displays overall fixed effects and specific fixed effects. First, under overall fixed effects, overall density and reciprocity effects are 
displayed. The negative value of the density parameter indicates that the probability of a relation is smaller than 0.5 when all other 
parameters and the random effects are equal to zero. This means that the network is relatively sparse. The reciprocity parameter is 
positive, indicating that advice relations have a tendency to be symmetrical (but not an extremely strong tendency compared to the size of 
the density effect). Below, under ‘Specific density similarity effect‘, the table displays a specific effect in which we are particularly 
interested: Chamber similarity. We find a strong, positive, and significant value for this parameter (in bold), indicating that the probability 
of an advice tie increases when judges are members of the same Chamber. Belonging to the same Chamber, that is, working together 
often, has a positive effect on establishing an advice relationship. Finally, deviances are model fit measures. They are 3266.34 for the 
empty model (i.e. the model without the Chamber similarity effect) and 3121.14 for the full model (i.e. the model with the ‘Chamber 
similarity’ effect), indicating an improvement in model fit due to the introduction of the ‘Chamber similarity’ variable into the model. 
N= 156. Standard deviations are in parentheses. Parameter estimation procedure is MCMC (Markov Chain Monte Carlo). Convergence 
criterion is 0.0001, reached after eight iterations. 
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the ‘Chamber similarity‘ effect), indicating an improvement 
in model fit due to the introduction of the ‘Chamber 
similarity’ variable into the model. In sum, this analysis 
shows that our second descriptive claim is established. This 
model confirms that informal flows of advice in this 
network are shaped by formal structure: judges tend to 
select advisors in their own Chamber. 
A stable pecking order 
Based on our spinning top model, our third descriptive 
claim predicted that the pecking order emerging from the 
analysis is stable over time. In effect, to some extent, the 
elite of advisors are stable over time. Correlation between 
measurements of indegree centrality in 2000 and 2002 is 
0.9. However, the same correlation between 2002 and 2005 
drops to 0.7. Thus, the first characteristic of the evolution of 
these networks supporting our spinning top model of intra- 
organizational learning is confirmed. As we speculated 
above, however, the drop in the correlation suggests that 
this stability is weakened by a different social process. 
Oscillation: Increasing and decreasing centralization over time 
Our fourth descriptive claim compares the dynamics of 
advice networks to oscillation in the centralization of the 
advice network among judges. In other words, this 
centralization should increase and then decrease over time 
as members with cognitive status try to avoid overload at 
the risk of accepting conflicts of definition of the situation. 
In order to test for the existence of this oscillation, we turn 
to a more dynamic analysis of the evolution of this 
network. This means looking more closely at the structural 
factors that explain relational turnover in the network, 
that is, the creation of new ties and the dropping of 
previously existing ones. 
Statistical confirmation for this claim is provided by 
Snijders’ (2001,2004,2005) ‘actor-oriented’ network model, 
Siena, which is specifically designed to model the evolution 
of networks through time. The model specification strategy 
included testing each independent variable on its own and 
providing a final model that was estimated by including 
only the significant parameters - with one exception - from 
the previous models. Table 2 presents the best (most 
parsimonious) Siena models achieved with this data set. 
These tests confirm that judges show a preference for 
advice seeking from advisors who are already sought out 
for advice by others: the ‘Popularity of alter’ effect is strong. 
During the first period, as shown by a strong ‘Activity of 
alter’ effect, they do not seek out advice from other judges 
who themselves seek out advice frequently. As suggested in 
our descriptive claims, senior judges - who are already 
central - become even more central. Increasing centrality of 
already central judges is the main effect produced by the 
formal dynamic force behind relational turnover in this 
organization between 2000 and 2002. 
Although smaller by comparison with popularity and 
activity of alter effects, effects captured by a few structural 
variables are also significant. If one ignores density 
(outdegree of the first wave, used as an intercept), 
reciprocal and transitive relationships also drive relational 
changes in the advice network in the first period. Judges 
seek out as advisor members to whom they previously gave 
advice directly; they also seek out advisors of their advisors. 
This trend suggests that new ties are established within 
social sub-groups already identified by actors, reinforcing 
homophilous evolution. 3-cycles within such groups are 
associated with a negative parameter, suggesting that 
generalized exchange is unlikely over time in this fairly 
hierarchical network. One can also observe that there is a 
limit to the number of advisors that each judge can seek 
Table 2 Collective learning as a cyclical process: increasing, then decreasing, centralization over time 
Independent variables Parameters for period 1 Parameters for period 2 
(wave 1 -wave 2)  (wave 2-wave 3) 
Rate parameter 
Density 
Reciprocity 
Transitivity 
Popularity of alter 
Activity of alter 
Three-cycles of generalized exchange 
22.25 (2.03) 
0.95 (0.16) 
0.50 (0.04) 
3.34 (0.40) 
-1.74 (0.09) 
-14.44 (1.84) 
-0.29 (0.09) 
30.58 (3.14) 
0.71 (0.13) 
3.84 (0.25) 
-2.23 (0.18) 
0.19 (0.01) 
-1.86 (1.87) 
-0.07 (0.01) 
This table presents two Siena models analyzing the evolution, over 5 years, of the advice network among judges at the Commercial court 
of Paris (2000-2005). The rate parameter models the amount of change between two observations of the network, that is, the speed by 
which the dependent variable changes. The ‘density’ effect accounts for the observed network density (based on the outdegree of each 
actor) and can be interpreted as an intercept. The positive reciprocity effect indicates that the tendency to reciprocate an advice 
relationship drives the evolution of the network. The positive transitivity effect indicates that the tendency to seek advice from one’s 
advisor’s advisor also drives the evolution of the network. The negative ‘three-cycle of generalized exchange’ effect indicates that the 
tendency to seek advice from an advisee of an advisee does not drive the evolution of the network; this effect shows that status 
differences do matter in advice seeking among judges, since they do not seek advice from judges ‘below’ them in the pecking order. The 
‘Popularity alter effect’ measures the extent to which members tend to select as advisors other members who are already sought out for 
advice, and that this tendency drives changes in the network. The strength and positive value of this parameter indicates that this is the 
main effect explaining changes in the network: central advisors become even more central over time. The ‘Activity of alter’ effect 
measures the extent to which members who seek out many advisors tend to be sought out themselves as advisors. The negative 
parameter means that this tendency does not drive the evolution of the network. However, this parameter is not significant for the second 
period, which indicates that during this period network centralization decreases. N= 91 for period 1 and N= 113 for period 2. Standard 
errors in parentheses. MCMC (Markov Chain Monte Carlo) estimation procedure. 
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(a ‘ceiling effect’ in advice seeking, e.g., for fear of looking 
incompetent), and that within this limit the concentration 
of new demands on those who were already important 
advisors is confirmed. These effects are consistent with 
Blau’s social exchange theory of advice for status. 
The second model of Table 2, measuring the evolution of 
the network for the second period of the study, confirms 
our fourth claim and captures the oscillation between 
increasing and decreasing centralization of the advice 
network. In effect, the relational turnover between wave 1 
(in 2000) and wave 2 (in 2002) accounted for a phase of 
increasing centralization. In turn, the subsequent relational 
turnover between wave 2 (in 2002) and wave 3 (in 2005) 
accounts for a decreasing centralization of the network. The 
‘Popularity of alter’ parameter remains strong: central 
members still attract new demands for advice and the more 
central they are the more central they tend to become. 
However, the fact that a judge seeks advice frequently no 
longer prevents (during the second period) other judges 
from seeking advice from him/her: the ‘Activity of alter’ 
parameter is no longer significant in the second period. 
This second effect, combined with the first effect and with 
the drop in the correlation between indegree centrality in 
wave 2 and indegree centrality in wave 3, indicates a 
downward tendency in the second period that did not exist 
during the first period: many central members lose some 
of their centrality in this downturn and, as a result, new 
members become more central than they were before, thus 
joining this elite of judges with cognitive status. 
These results establish the spinning top model. They 
show very clearly that intra-organizational learning, as an 
informal process, depends on three factors at least. First, 
the way in which members manage their advice ties in the 
context of this formal organization. Second, the ways in 
which central advisors handle overload and conflicts of 
definition of the situation. Third, the ways in which formal 
structure can help in dealing with this oscillation of 
centralization and decentralization of the advice network. 
In effect, changing levels of centralization over time suggest 
that this oscillation can weaken collective learning as driven 
by formal structure. 
Discussion and conclusion 
We proposed and established a heuristic model, called 
‘spinning top model’, that helps explore the relationship 
between formal structure of the organization and endogen- 
ous processes such as intra-organizational learning. This 
exploration is based on the description of the structure and 
dynamics of advice networks in organizations. The model 
brings together previous knowledge on advice networks 
and sheds some new light on intra-organizational learning. 
In particular, it assumes that such a process depends on the 
capacity of the organization to generate an elite of advisors 
that tries to remain stable while homophilous advice ties 
among other members of the organization are subjected to 
rapid turnover (e.g., by a job rotation policy, or by the need 
to find new knowledge that former advisors cannot 
provide). Intra-organizational learning also depends on 
the capacity of the organization to manage the oscillation 
created by increases and decreases in the centrality of these 
elites. 
Our descriptive claims, derived from this heuristic view 
of the mechanism, receive support from our data set. The 
dynamics of the advice network examined in this commer- 
cial court can indeed be represented intuitively as a 
spinning top. They are driven by the rotation rule in the 
formal structure of organization. Since judges seek advice 
first within their own Chamber, and since they change 
Chamber every year, the relational turnover in this network 
is high. Each year, each judge leaves behind several advisors 
and creates new advice ties within hidher new Chamber. 
This turnover, however, is compensated by the creation of a 
set of advisors with cognitive status to whom judges turn 
for advice regardless of the Chamber in which they work. 
The centrality scores of members with cognitive status 
increase, then tend to decrease over time, showing that the 
issue of stabilization or replacement of this elite of judges 
adds to the complexity of the dynamics of advice networks. 
This social process is thus driven by (formally induced) 
homophily, relational turnover, centralization of the advice 
network, and strategies of stabilization of this elite under 
capacity constraints. This complex process predicts that 
later observations should find a permanent cyclical pattern 
of centralization and decentralization of advice networks. 
Several questions remain unanswered with this author- 
ity-based and oscillatory view of intra-organizational 
learning, and point to limitations of our work. First, we 
cannot say that oscillation between centralization and 
decentralization is the only dynamic process shaping 
intra-organizational advice networks. The centrality of a 
few exceptional advisors never decreases (until they exit the 
system, often with honours). The spinning top model thus 
shows the importance, in intra-organizational learning, of 
monitoring and reproducing this cognitive elite. 
Second, the nature of this oscillation needs to be 
examined. Decision making can be quickly centralized to 
react to a threat; but the pendulum may not swing with the 
same speed in one direction or in the other: it may take 
much longer for overloaded members to delegate, reshuffle 
the system around themselves, and decentralize than it 
takes to recentralize. Only certain kinds of organizations 
may then be able to afford the sort of processes requiring 
far-sighted investments and maintenance. 
Third, it is still unclear whether the stabilization of the 
elite could either be the result of coordination among 
senior advisors who act jointly to define common solutions 
to non-standardized problems; or be only the result of 
independent decisions by individual elites to this oscillating 
behavior in the delegation of cognitive authority. Fourth, 
from the perspective of a theory of the evolution of 
relational structures, this model stresses endogenous intra- 
organizational learning and leaves out exogenous effects on 
learning as a social process (such as, in our case, a change 
in an important area of law, which would suddenly make 
specific judges specialized in that area more attractive as 
sources of advice) (Burt, 2004). 
In conclusion, we depart from the communities of 
practice and network learning literatures by stressing the 
importance of formal structure of the organization and by 
approaching learning with microsocial processes of homo- 
phily in, and centralization of, advice networks. These 
processes are triggered and shaped by the formal organiza- 
tion (internal differentiations, rotation rules). Intra-orga- 
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nizational learning thus depends on the capacity of the 
formal organization to channel informal advice seeking. 
Examining the dynamics of advice networks shows that this 
channelling by the formal organization drives the evolution 
of the advice network itself. This channelling also creates 
the need to stabilize the fragile structure that it generates 
through complex social processes. Without such a stabili- 
zation, members with cognitive status and authority cannot 
preserve accumulated knowledge in an organization that 
overall experiences high turnover and systematic job 
rotation, and hence runs the danger of inadequately sharing 
knowledge among its members. Without a dynamic 
understanding of the relationship between formal organiza- 
tion and informal behavior, organizations cannot evaluate 
their own capacity to be learning-friendly environments 
accommodating complex learning dynamics. 
7 
and with random effects. For more precise information about 
how p2  deals with dependence of observations, see Van Duijn 
(1995) and Van Duijn et al. (2004). There are several kinds of 
models for this type of statistical analysis, for example 
exponential random graph models or quadratic assignment 
procedures. The most important advantage of p2 over other 
models is its inclusion of random sender and receiver effects 
and taking into account their dependence. These effects allow 
for varying indegrees and outdegrees of actors - as often 
observed in social network data - and model them in a 
parsimonious way. 
For more detailed information about this court, see Lazega and 
Mounier (2003); Lemercier (2003). 
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